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CASE COMMENTS

within the possession of the doctor.' Still another argument for the
application of the doctrine is that plaintiff should not be barred
from the doctrine merely because he is suing a doctor rather than
a bottle or airplane manufacturer.5 2 In this regard perhaps a statement that appeared in a 1934 article in the West Virginia Law
Quarterly is both apropos and conclusive:
As the practice of medicine in its various branches tends to
become a business rather than a personal relation ... when the
medical profession laid aside as outmoded and unsanitary the
shawl of the family doctor . . . and assume the efficient white
jacket of specialization and commercialism, it likewise lost the
armor of infallibility that the shawl concealed. 3
Martin J. Glasser

Wills-Contingent
T died of natural causes. He left a holographic will while prefaced
dispositive provisions with the clauses "In event that I get killed..."
and "In case of accident.. ." The Chancery Court refused to admit
the will to probate on the basis that the operation of the will was
contingent upon T's being killed or dying in an accident. Held,
affirmed and remanded. The language employed in the will was
clearly conditional upon the death by accident or violent means,
and death having occurred due to natural causes, the attempted
testamentary disposition became inoperative and void, and was
properly denied for probate. In re Estate of Martin, 199 So.2d 829
(Miss. 1967).
The principal case is one of a long line of cases in which the
courts have been presented with the problem of determining whether
the operation of a particular holographic will was contingent on the
occurrence of a specified event or whether the will was absolute and
intended to be operative in any event. The decision in the principal
case appears to be a very sound and justifiable one. However, it
appears to be rather difficult to reconcile this decision with West
Virginia decisions dealing with the same issue. Thus, it is of value to
51 60 MIcH. L. REv. 1153, 1154 (1962).
52 Id. at 1155.
53 Posten, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 35 (1934).
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investigate this subject and to determine the manner in which the
courts have dealt with the construction of holographic wills which
are apparently contingent.
A contingent will is a will that is to become operative if, and
only if, a particular event occurs.' Common cases concern wills
which are contingent on the failure of the testator to return from a
particular trip.' Wills are less often made contingent on the failure
of the testator to survive a particular operation,' the failure of the
testator to return from war,' the accidental or sudden death of the
testator, 5 or on some other specified contingency.
Although the courts of various jurisdictions are in agreement
regarding the elements of a contingent will, there is much
disagreement in the construction of contingent wills.' The differences
in the construction of these wills result primarily from (1) the
dissimilar factual situation in each case and (2) the various manners
in which the wills are worded., In most cases the particular factual
circumstances existing when the will was executed will play the
major role in determining whether a will is construed to be contingent
or absolute.8 For this reason the principle that the construction of
Bagnall v. Bagnall, 148 Tex. 423, 425, 225 S.W.2d 401, 402 (1946).
Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411 (1904); Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174
(1835); Taylor's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 574, 259 P.2d 1014 (1953); Barber v. Barber, 368 Ill. 215, 13 N.E.2d 257 (1938); In re will of Tinsley, 187
Ia. 23, 174 N.W. 4 (1919); Watkins v. Watkins Adm'r, 269 Ky. 246 106
S.W.2d 975 (1937); Succession of Gurganus, 206 La. 1012, 20 So. 2a 296
(1944); Redhead v. Redhead, 83 Miss. 141, 35 So. 761 (1904); Estate of
Coleman, 139 Mont. 58, 359 P.2d 502 (1961); In re Langer's Estate, 281
N.Y.S. 866 (1935).
' Estate of Del Val, 159 Cal. App. 2d 600, 323 P.2d 1011 (1958);
McCray v. Long, 303 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1957); Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky.
795, 215 S.W. 800 (1919); Davis v. Davis, 107 Miss. 245, 65 So. 241
1

2

(1914).

4 In re Stephenson's Estate, 45 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1965); Magee v. McNeil,
41 Miss. 17 (1866).
5 Boyles v. Gresham, 153 Tex. 106, 263 S.W.2d 935 (1954); Shipwith
v. Cabell, 60 Va. (19 Gratt.) 758 (1870); French v. French, 14 W. Va.
458 (1877).
6 McMerriman v. Schiel, 108 O.S. 334, 338, 140 N.E. 600, 602 (1923).
7 Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795, 810, 215 S.W. 800, 806 (1919).
8 Barber v. Barber
368 II. 215, 222-23, 13 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1938).
It has been suggested that the circumstances existing at the time the testator
executes his will which may be considered by the court in determining
whether the testator intended his will to be absolute or conditional include
the following: circumstances surrounding the execution of the document
and its delivery; the testator's state of health; his plans for the future; the
preservation of the document, particularly after the contingency has failed;
instructions upon delivery; subsequent declarations of the testator; lack of
another subsequent will; lack of alternative disposition of the property
and the amount of the estate disposed of by the instrument. Estate of Del
Val, 159 Cal. App. 2d 600, 323 P.2d 1011 (1958).
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one will is no certain guide to the construction of another is
particularly applicable in determining whether a will is absolute or
contingent. 9
In construing a will that may possibly be contingent, the objective,
as in the construction of all wills, is to determine whether the testator
intended the will to be contingent or absolute. It is only when the
language of the testator does not clearly indicate that he intended the
will to be either contingent or absolute that a problem of construction
arises. The court must then resort to well settled rules of construction.
It is often said that the fact the testator leaves a will implies that
he does not wish to die intestate. 0 This, of course, operates to
influence the construction of a will as absolute. Although a
contingent will can be created, the intention to do so must clearly
appear in the will, either in express terms or by necessary
implication," and a condition will not be implied from indefinite
language. 2 Thus, the courts follow the rule that a will will be
construed to be absolute and not contingent unless an intention to
the contrary clearly appears,' 3 and, if a will is equally susceptible to
a construction as either absolute or contingent, the will is entitled to
probate as an absolute will. 4 If the event mentioned in the will
indicates merely the inducement or reason for the execution of the
will at the particular time and does not indicate that the event
mentioned is to be a condition precedent to the operation of the
will, then the will will be considered absolute. 5 Clearly the language
of the will in the principal case is sufficient to create a condition
precedent to the operation of the will and does not merely express
the inducement for the execution of the will. It has been held that
the use of the word "if" clearly implies a condition; it means
"provided" or "in case that."' 6 Under this construction both phrases
in the principal case were properly considered conditional.
In contrast to those phrases in the principal case is the following
language held to be non-contingent: "This will is written with the
9 Morrison's Will, 361 Pa. 419, 421-22, 65 A.2d 384, 386 (1949).
10 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 122, 45 S.W.2d 1096, 1097
(1931).
11 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 122, 45 S.W.2d 1096, 1099
(1931); French v. French, 14 W. Va. 458, 499 (1877).
,2Taylor's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 574, 581, 259 P.2d 1014, 1018
(1953).
13

(1931).
14

Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 122, 45 S.W.2d 1096, 1097

Id.

Barber v. Barber, 368 Ill.215, 221, 13 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1938);
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 122, 45 S.W.2d 1096, 1097 (1931).
16 Bagnall v. Bagnall, 148 Tex. 423, 426, 225 S.W.2d 401, 402 (1946).
15
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idea that something might happen to me that I would be wiped out
suddenly. If this should happen my business would be in an awful
shape.

. ."'

There the will was not contingent on the sudden death

of the testator, but rather the language expressed the reason or
inducement for making his will at the particular time, i.e., the fact
that his business would be in an "awful shape" if he should die
suddenly. Absence of reference to a certain period or to a certain
emergency during which the testator wishes his will to remain
operative is evidence that he intended it to be an absolute
8
unconditional will no matter what should occur in the future.'
The principal case, in contrast to other cases of the same nature,
is somewhat unusual in one respect. The court did not find it
necessary to rely heavily on the circumstances existing at the time
the will was executed in determining whether the testator intended
that his will be contingent or absolute. The words of the will were
clearly conditional and expressed his intention that the will was
to take effect only if he were killed or died in an accident. However,
in most cases these facts are a major consideration in the court's
decision. An early West Virginia case, French v. French,'9 illustrates
this proposition very well. Testator was about to depart on a journey
that would necessitate his crossing a river then at flood stage. He
thus executed a will in the following terms: ".

. .

. if I get drowned

this morning, March 7, 1872, I bequeath all my property, personal
and real, to my beloved wife. . . ."" He returned from the trip and
did not die until almost two years later. Using numerous assumptions

the court concluded that his will was absolute and unconditional. The
court first assumed that the testator was aware that had he died
intestate on March 7, 1872, his wife would have taken all his property
anyway under the then-existing statute of descent and distribution."
Secondly, the court assumed that he executed his will in contemplation of charges to be made in the statute of descent and distribution
subsequent to March 7, 1872, which reduced the share the wife
would take at his death. The court then was able to conclude that the
will was an absolute will." The court pointed out that to hold
17

Boyles v. Gresham, 153 Tex. 106, 108, 263 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1954).

18 Watkins v. Watldns Adm'r, 269 Ky. 246, 249, 106 S.W.2d 975, 977

(1937); In re Langer's Estate, 28 N.Y.S. 866, 868 (1935).
19 14 W. Va. 458 (1877).
Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
2' Id. at 489.
22 Id. at 503.
20
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otherwise would attribute to the testator the doing of an idle act. 3
An application of the normal rules of construction indicates, however,
that this will was conditional and not absolute. In express terms the
testator makes clear his intention that the will is to be contingent.
Certainly, the testator by specifying a particular date and a certain
event intended his will to be conditional, operative only on that date
and until that event had passed. Yet the court proceeding contrary to
the accepted rules of construction, and disregarding what would
seem to be a clearly expressed intention, determined that the testator
mentioned the specific period and event only as an indication of
the inducement for the execution of the will and not a condition
precedent to its operation. Although the decision was limited to its
facts,24 it appears that the broad facts surrounding the execution of
the will were allowed to override the testator's expressed conditional
intent in this particular case.
In a more recent West Virginia case, Bank v. Wehrle,2" the court
again found it necessary to determine whether a will was absolute or
contingent. The ambiguous clause there stated: "If anything happens

to us on this trip that we shouldn't return, I want all my property
and all my interest in the property to be devised.... This is my will
and wishes." 26 Obviously, whether this will was absolute or
contingent presented a much closer question than that of the French
case. The terms are more general: "anything" replaces "drowning,"
and "this trip" replaces "this morning." It is easy to perceive the
two interpretations in this case. Wills which involved very similar
language have been held to be both absolute and contingent, the
decision often turning on the peculiar facts of the particular case.2"
In fact, the court recognized that the language of the Bank case was
23 Id. at 500-01.
24 Id. at 502.
25 124 W. Va. 268, 20 S.E.2d 112 (1942).
26 Id. at 274, 20 S.E.2d at 115.
27 See In re Moore's Estate, 15 R.I. 245, 2 A.2d 761 (1938), where the
will provided as follows: "I am writeing my will if anything Hapins to me
this is my Will
" "...
Before I come Home I will ten thousand to ....
I write and Sign." Testatrix died twenty years after returning from the
trip. The court held the will to be absolute theorizing that the failure
of the testatrix to revoke the will expressly indicated that she did not
intend to die intestate. In Bagnall v. Bagnall, 148 Tex. 423, 225 S.W.2d
401 (1946), the will provided as follows: "If anything happens to me.
While gone. All my belongs and estate to goes to ....- This will was held
to be contingent. The court gave some weight to the fact that the testator
executed the will immediately prior to leaving on a hunting trip thus indicatmng it was to be operative only for the duration of the trip.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 27
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

much less restrictive and specific than that of the French case. This
fact, together with the disfavor with which the law views intestacy, led
the court to conclude that the will was an absolute will."
In dealing with wills that may possibly be contingent the courts
have demonstrated a strong desire to interpret these wills as
absolute and thus preclude the possibility that a "testator" might die
intestate. The French case exemplifies this desire. The process of
construction of these wills usually proceeds on three bases: first, a
comparison of the language of the will in question with other similiar
wills; second, an application of rules of construction to the will in
question; and third, a consideration of the peculiar facts and
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will in question. The
technique of basing a decision primarily on a comparison of the terms
of the will in issue with the terms of other similar wills would appear
to have only limited value in close cases such as the Bank case. Bank
was an appropriate case for the application of established rules of
construction and for a full analysis of the peculiar facts surrounding
the testator at the time the will was executed. This approach was
not used however, and it appears most difficult to understand how
the French case could be authority for the proposition that the will
in issue in the Bank case was or was intended to be absolute.
Also, when wills are expressly contingent, the court should, as
in the principal case, give effect to the testators wishes, and should
not as seems to have been done in the French case, allow a desire
to construe a will as absolute, coupled with an over-emphasis on the
facts of the case, override the testator's clearly expressed intention.
James Alan Harris

28 Bank v. Wehrle, 124 W. Va. 268, 274, 20 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1942).
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